dc.contributor.author | Seki, Erika | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2005-10-11T10:27:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2005-10-11T10:27:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-10 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0143 4543 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2164/9 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption. | en |
dc.format.extent | 636400 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | University of Aberdeen Business School | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics Working Paper Series | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2004-07 | en |
dc.subject | price discrimination | en |
dc.subject | fisheries | en |
dc.subject | alternating duopoly | en |
dc.subject | durable goods | en |
dc.title | Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence. | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |